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ABSTRAK
Koordinasi antar-lembaga dalam penanganan pendanaan terorisme pada organisasi
kemasyarakatan (ormas) di Indonesia memiliki beberapa kelemahan. Artikel berikut
mengaplikasikan analisis tekstual dan pendekatan analisis kebijakan berbasis bukti
untuk mendapatkan mekanisme koordinasi dari beberapa negara sehingga dapat
digunakan untuk mendesain sebuah model koordinasi antar-lembaga. Model tersebut
menjelaskan mekanisme yang dapat memberikan perubahan dan meminimalkan
risiko pendanaan terorisme pada ormas. Dari analisis yang dilakukan atas beberapa
negara yang di antaranya adalah Australia, Malaysia, Arab Saudi, dan Singapura,
artikel ini beranggapan bahwa sebuah mekanisme koordinasi antarlembaga yang
efektif mencakup di antaranya sinkronisasi atas kebijakan, tugas, fungsi, dan tanggung
jawab seluruh lembaga yang terlibat. Kemudian, dengan adanya sinkronisasi tersebut
maka lembaga-lembaga dapat menyusun prioritas intervensi dan alokasi sumber daya
untuk faktor-faktor yang terdapat pada ormas yang rentan akan pendanaan terorisme.
Penelitian ini bersifat preskriptif dengan mengusulkan sebuah model koordinasi antarlembaga dengan empat mekanisme yaitu usaha kolaboratif untuk menciptakan satu
database yang terintegrasi, penilaian risiko pada ormas, penentuan prioritas untuk
pelaksanaan sosialisasi, edukasi, pemantauan, dan pengawasan, serta implementasi
pendekatan network-model untuk meningkatkan pertukaran informasi secara sukarela.
Kata kunci: kebijakan berbasis bukti, koordinasi antar-lembaga, pendanaan terorisme,
organisasi kemasyarakatan
ABSTRACT
Indonesian interagency coordination to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by
nonprofit organizations has several drawbacks. This article applies textual analysis
and an evidence-based approach to draw effective coordination mechanisms from
several countries’ experiences and to design a model of interagency coordination.
The model illustrates mechanisms that can be the drivers of changes and minimize
ineffective interagency coordination, which may lead to an increase in nonprofit
vulnerabilities to terrorist-financing of fenses. Evidence drawn from several
countries that are contextually relevant to Indonesia, namely, Australia, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, illustrates that effective interagency coordination
potentially reduces the risks of terrorist financing and has synchronized policies,
*The author is a Financial Transaction Supervisor at Directorate of Compliance Supervision,
PPATK.
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objectives, functions, and responsibilities among authorities. Therefore, authorities
can prioritize interventions and resources to address the most vulnerable factors.
This article suggests improvements in four aspects: collaborative endeavors toward
single integrated databases; comprehensive risk assessment of nonprofits; priority
settings on socialization, education, monitoring, and supervision; and network model
to improve voluntary information sharing.
Keywords: evidence-based policy making, joined-up government, terrorist financing,
nonprofit organization
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.264

I N T RODUC T ION

In 2001, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force published
its Special Recommendations (SRs), which illustrate the connections
between nonprofit organizations or nonprofits (Casey 2016) and terrorist-financing offenses. Historically, the SRs have also observed the integration of money laundering countermeasures into terrorist-financing
prevention approaches. In Indonesia, the integration is embodied within
and implemented by a coordination framework, the National Coordination Committee (NCC; see Table 1).
Table 1
Policy and agencies within the National Coordination Committee (NCC)
Policy arrangements Policy instruments
Prevention and
mitigation

Law enforcement

Members of NCC in the prevention of terrorist-financing
offenses by nonprofits
Supervision and
Kemenkumham (Kementerian Hukum dan HAM - Ministry of
monitoring
Law and Human Rights)
Information sharing
Kemensos (Kementerian Sosial - Ministry of Social Affairs) –
nonmember of NCC
Socialization and
Kemendagri (Kementerian Dalam Negeri - Ministry of Home
education on terrorist
Affairs)
financing to government Kemenlu (Kementerian Luar Negeri - Ministry of Foreign
authorities, financial
Affairs)
institutions, and
Kemenag (Kementerian Agama - Ministry of Religious Affairs)
nonprofit organizations

Investigation and
prosecution

Densus 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti Teror - The
Detachment 88 of the Indonesian National Police)
BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme - National
Counterterrorism Agency)
BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara - State Intelligence Agency)
Kejagung (Kejaksaan Agung - Attorney General Office)
PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan
- Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis
Centre)

Sources: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (2018); the Presidential Regulation
18/2017; the Executive Regulation 58/2016; the Executive Regulation 59/2016
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Indonesian nonprofits, foundations (yayasan) and associations (perkumpulan), are the most vulnerable sectors because of sectoral and regulatory vulnerabilities. Sectoral vulnerabilities are significantly high because
of the nonprofits’ low capacities to prevent and mitigate their operation
from terrorist-financing risks (Australian Financial Transaction Reports
and Analysis Centre 2017a, 27–29). During 2015–2017, 292 cases of terrorism or terrorist-financing offenses in Indonesia involved nonprofits;
this was recorded as the highest among ASEAN, Australia, and New
Zealand (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 2015; Australian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 2016; 2017a).
However, the government’s responses to that condition were slightly
insufficient because they loosened their policy, as indicated by the Asia/
Pacific Group on Money Laundering’s (APG) report. The APG notes a
policy taken by the Indonesian authorities in adjusting the nonprofits’
risk levels from high to medium risk in 2018 which was followed by a
relatively less comprehensive indication of the type of high-risk nonprofits (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2008, 28).
Indonesian regulatory measures such as regulatory oversight, outreach to nonprofits, and national cooperation and coordination also
have potential pitfalls that may contribute to nonprofits’ vulnerability.
First, in Table 2, some measures in the Civil Society Organization
Law 17/2013 are considered repressive, discriminatory, and excessively
bureaucratic, and this sentiment was the same for its predecessor, Law
8/1985 (The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2018). In this
sense, government interventions to govern nonprofits may experience
obstacles.
Another regulation, Presidential Regulation Number 18 of 2017 on
donations to and from nonprofit organizations, is a progressive step
because it requires nonprofits to perform activities commonly implemented within financial institutions. However, two critical instruments,
mandatory reporting activities and the suspicious donation categories,
are absent in the regulation’s provision. The absence of these instruments may affect the effectiveness of the nonprofit’s terrorist-financing
countermeasures. Therefore, these pitfalls within the two nonprofit
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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regulations may be counterproductive for the anticipated nonprofit
compliance levels that were considered the medium level (Australian
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 2017a).
Table 2
Provisions of Law 8/1985 and Law 17/2013
Measures
Types of
nonprofits and
organizational
changes

Descriptions
Article 8 Law 8/1985 was nuanced with significant control on nonprofit
activities by the government. Although Law 8/1985 did not regulate the types
of nonprofits as did Law 17/2013, under the former regulation, nonprofits
had been obliged to identify and to associate themselves into one group of
nonprofits that had similar objectives and activities. By contrast, the control
of the government within Law 17/2013 is under a provision that specifically
classifies nonprofits into formal (foundation; yayasan) and associations
(perkumpulan)) and informal. Moreover, the Law obliges nonprofits to report
within 30 days to either the national or local government any changes in
management, personnel, and organization structures. Although that obligation
has no legal consequences, it may potentially impose excessive bureaucratic
control on civil society activities
Prohibitions and Article 7 Law 8/1985 and Article 21 and 59 Law 17/2013 regulate the ideological
obligations
aspect of nonprofits that should be in accordance with Pancasila and UUD
1945. These provisions sound positive but they are potentially being abused
by the government to dissolve any nonprofits critical of the government’s
policies. On the nonprofit operation level (financial), Law 17/2013 may create
disputes over the prohibition of nonprofits to receive from and/or transfer any
funds to any parties not in accordance with government policies

Source: Compiled by author from related sources

These regulatory challenges may create more drawbacks because the
implementation of terrorist-financing regulations has resulted in disruptions of nonprofit activities. This disruption may lead to legal and
reputational consequences for nonprofits unintentionally involved in
terrorist financing (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2011; Othman and
Ameer 2014; Shillito 2015; Australian Financial Transaction Reports
and Analysis Centre 2017b, 60). Furthermore, a study indicated that
counterterrorism interventions such as education programs, legislation,
and punishment (e.g., sentencing) did not statistically illustrate effectiveness in reducing terrorism offenses across time, and in some cases, the
interventions counterproductively increased the offenses (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006, 508).
Second, the findings of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering clearly demonstrated that the existing interagency coordination
has not significantly improved since 2010, as documented in the NPO
Domestic Review. The fundamental problems with this coordination
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol5/iss2/4
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are as follows: (1) the registration and validation of nonprofits are spread
across several ministries; (2) ineffective monitoring and supervision affect the sanctions that are not always imposed on the nonprofits linked
to terrorist organizations; (3) nonintegrated databases and ineffective
information sharing, as illustrated by the disagreement among agencies
regarding the changes of nonprofits’ risk levels from high to medium
risk; and (4) limited partnerships between the competent authorities and
nonprofit organizations limit the outreach of socialization and educational programs (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2008; Pusat
Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 2010).
This article assumes a reciprocal cause and effect between the coordination mechanisms in implementing the policy instruments (Table
1) and the provisions of two nonprofit regulations, Law 17/2013 and
the Regulation 18/2017. The ineffective dissemination of information
among authorities at strategic and operational levels may contribute to
the regulations’ vagueness and incomprehensiveness, and the regulations’ requirements may result in a coordination mechanism without
clear strategic and operational plans. For example, Presidential Regulation Number 18 of 2017 generally notes context differences between
money laundering and terrorist-financing attempts to apply money
laundering measures well established within the financial industry to
nonprofits. However, the difference in organizational orientations between the two sectors may lead to the ineffectiveness of nonprofits’
countermeasures. In that sense, such policies may become burdensome
to authorities (Sinha 2013; Tofangsaz 2015; Hamin et al. 2016). The
analysis and implementation of countermeasures from other sectors or
countries against Indonesian nonprofits and terrorist-financing policies
require an adaptation of their requirements. That contextual adaptation from one sector to another potentially creates an ideal condition
that stimulates authorities to harmonize their various functions and responsibilities. However, ironically, these drawbacks of the coordination
mechanisms are commonly experienced by authorities in the ASEAN,
Australia, and New Zealand (Australian Financial Transaction Reports
and Analysis Centre 2017a).
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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Despite that irony and given the global effort to combat terrorism
and terrorist financing, in this article, we assume that countries can
learn and adapt to others’ policies and mechanisms. This article emphasizes that by drawing on the evidence of countries’ coordination
mechanisms, we can construct an improved model of interagency coordination that is contextually relevant to Indonesia’s attempt to prevent
terrorist funding through nonprofits. Relevant to that objective, we post
the following question: What can be learned from other countries’ experiences of interagency coordination to prevent nonprofit organizations from
committing terrorist-financing offenses? The following analysis elaborates
on evidence-based policy-making and joined-up government approaches
to construct that coordination model.
E V I DENCE - BA SED P OL IC Y A NA LY SIS A N D JOI N ED - U P
G OV ER N M EN T: A N A LT ER NAT I V E G OV ER NA NCE FOR
PR E V EN T I NG T ER ROR IS T- F I NA NCI NG OF F ENSES

The transformation of public governance into so-called private sector practices was initiated by the new public management (NPM) in
Anglo-Saxon countries by the late 1980s (Pollitt 2003). NPM had transformed the ideas of neoliberal government into a dominant, hegemonic
ideology, rather than into other ideas, namely, those of the Weberian
bureaucracy, which had been criticized as inefficient and irresponsive.
The idea of the specialization of NPM was initially effective at improving the desired efficiency but was subsequently questioned when
solving complex problems and to some extent was counterproductive
to the achievement of overall policy objectives (Ling 2002; Fimreite,
Christensen, and Lægreid 2012). A study on the United Kingdom’s
specialization illustrates the phenomenon of departmentalism among
ministers and government officials (Kavanagh and Richards 2001). In
the context of specialization, the division of labor that was already established within the industrial sector has gained influence over various levels of government and transformed the latter to become more
function specific.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol5/iss2/4
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One alternative to minimizing the effects of specialization is joinedup government. This alternative governance aims to inspire government
actors to coordinate and harmonize their thinking and action toward
common objectives (Ling 2002; Pollitt 2003; Fimreite, Christensen, and
Lægreid 2012). Within that context of harmonic thinking and action,
joined-up government is not an entity of coordination but a long-term
cooperative process and mechanism or an enabler that emphasizes a
democratic, participative political freedom to ensure government organizations cooperate to create innovation (Ling 2002; Pollitt 2003; Davies
2009; Fimreite, Christensen, and Lægreid 2012). However, joined-up
government can transform into a form of integration (Martorell and
Abergel 2018). Despite that contrast, the tenet of joined-up government
either as an integration of policy or an enabler of collaboration is significantly similar because they both advocate for participative decisionmaking to reach common objectives.
As a democratic and participative mechanism, the joined-up government aims to overcome existing hierarchies of involved organizations
and improve information flow (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kavanagh
and Richards 2001; Pollitt 2003; Davies 2009; Carey and Crammond
2015). However, because nothing is solid, this alternative governance
has limitations. First, the participative mechanisms advocated by joinedup government can be degraded if some parties are imposing their
power and interests rather than working cooperatively (Davies 2009).
Second, because joined-up government is a process rather than an entity, the concept requires a distinct means of performance measurement
(Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Pollitt 2003; Fimreite, Christensen, and
Lægreid 2012).
Studies on joined-up government can produce an enormous amount
of contextual knowledge and evidence from other jurisdictions’ experiences about what works and what does not. These studies are significant because they inform policy analysts regarding future initiatives for
planning and implementation (Carey and Crammond 2015). Although
evidence hierarchies have ranked hard evidence or scientific evidence
relatively higher than evidence produced from individual, communiPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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ties, or countries’ experiences (Wolf and Baehler 2017), the latter type
of evidence has the function of predicting and projecting the expected
results (Rose 2002; Head 2008; Ettelt, Mays, and Nolte 2012). In the
context of preventing terrorist-financing offenses, evidence of joined-up
government within various countries can be analyzed to design an interagency coordination model that is appropriate to apply in Indonesian
policy settings.
Generating and adapting evidence from other countries’ experiences
is commonly referred to as knowledge utilization (Rose 2002), a concept
with an integrated structure that comprises information pick-up, information interpretation, and information application (Ettelt, Mays, and
Nolte 2012). A study applied the concepts of abduction and phronesis
and demonstrated that the capacity to utilize and adapt that type of evidence to their policy settings stems, in part, from an analyst’s subjective
judgment developed through frequent policy experiences while comparing others’ policy settings with their own (Wolf and Baehler 2017).
That comparative analysis and analogy-making are modeled through
a base scenario (Wolf and Baehler 2017). The model focuses on comparisons between the existing problems (the base case-A) with the relevant policies from other cases (the exemplar-B) to create the intended
results (the prospective case-A`). This comparison is a process in search
of ideas relevant to an individual’s problems (Bardach 2004, 206). In
a comparison of B to A, analysts will develop causal narratives (Rose
2002) on social mechanisms (Barzelay 2007) that explain the processes
within B that successfully stimulate its outcomes. Furthermore, based
on these narratives, the analysts simultaneously make analogical connections between B and A while considering A’s context and policy
objectives as they consider how lessons from B might lead to intended
results in A. This base scenario emphasizes iterative processes that enable the analysts to rethink and redesign policy problems, performance
indicators, or intended outcomes (Wolf and Baehler 2017).
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R ESE A RCH M E T HOD

This article applies textual analysis (Thomas 2013) to draw on contextual evidence from four exemplar countries, namely, Australia, Malaysia,
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, that can be adapted to what might be an
effective policy on Indonesian settings. The selection criteria applied
to these countries are as follows: (1) their effectiveness and technical
compliance ratings as documented by the FATF Consolidated Table
(The Financial Action Task Force 2019) and (2) the context similarities between these countries and Indonesia that follow criteria such as
psychological factors and countries’ interdependence (Rose 2002).
The evidence is retrieved from primary and secondary sources published by governments and non-governmental organizations. The primary sources are four documents on the Mutual Evaluation Review of
the four countries and two follow-up reports—one each—from Australia
and Malaysia. In this article, we assume that the primary sources are
relatively authoritative such that they can illustrate countries’ current
and ongoing policies. The secondary sources are nine peer-reviewed
academic articles and other publications that have analyzed topics relevant to this paper and that are related to terrorist financing.
The evidence-generating process applies a cross-checking approach
to primary and secondary sources with a focus on the comparative
analysis of countries and analogy-making to project and predict the expected results (Wolf and Baehler 2017). In this analysis, evidence is categorized based on the policy instruments and coordination mechanisms
as expounded in Table 1 and the theories of joined-up government. The
finding categories is summarized in Table 3. Furthermore, we compared and interpreted that evidence to find the potential interagency
coordination mechanisms that effectively prevent nonprofits from committing terrorist-financing offenses. The categories are as follows:
Table 3
The finding categories
Policy instruments
Integrated databases
Information-sharing system
Risk-based approach

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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Socialization and education
Monitoring and supervision
Investigation and prosecution
Immediate outcome is reducing nonprofits’
vulnerabilities to terrorist-financing offenses

Minimizing problems related to hierarchy
Performance measurement

Source: Compiled by the author from related sources

E V I DENCE F ROM T H E E X EM PL A R
COU N T R I ES ’ E X PER I ENCES

Evidence drawn from the exemplar countries illustrates the manifestation of national strategies to enact terrorist-financing measures that can
stimulate involved authorities to implement an effective coordination
mechanism to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits. The
effects of these national strategies can be observed from two elements
of the countries’ coordination mechanisms. The first element is synchronizing actions, objectives, and policies, and the second is arranging
the organizations’ functions and responsibilities within an interagency
coordination framework. However, despite these countries’ effective
coordination process, evidence indicates two strategic variations that
can lead to different consequences.
The first strategic type is the scaling-up national strategy that mainstreams the discourse of money laundering and terrorist financing in
a manner that benefits a country’s national interests. To some extent,
this scaling-up strategy has proven effective in influencing political
leaders when directing their national agenda and particularly in developing transparency and accountability among public and private institutions. The second strategic type is the national strategy that does not
mainstream the money laundering and terrorist financing discourse at
the national level. This strategy requires accumulating performance
indicators from various authorities who are working within a coordination framework. However, this type has a relatively small influence on
reframing authorities’ awareness of common objectives and potentially
leads to departmentalism. Malaysia applies the first type of strategy,
where the terrorist financing or money laundering system, in general,
has hegemonic roles that have proven more effective in reframing the
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol5/iss2/4
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actors’ coordinated thinking and actions. Therefore, this scaled-up national strategy is favorable to synchronize policies, actions, objectives,
and organizations’ functions and responsibilities to prevent terroristfinancing offenses by nonprofits.
In policy and objective settings, regardless of their national strategy
types, exemplar countries have synchronized and interlinked policy instruments. In this sense, each instrument has reciprocally affected one
another. For example, the foremost instrument is a comprehensive risk
assessment of terrorist financing and nonprofits. This risk assessment
has functioned as the reference before formulating and implementing other instruments such as information-sharing systems, monitoring
and supervision, or socialization and education. Some exemplar countries have detailed risk profiles on nonprofits’ financial and managerial
information or their typical financial transactions. To some extent, a
comprehensive risk document must be beneficial to inform actors of
the policy and operational levels. Furthermore, the evidence in the
literature has emphasized that the absence of the document may result
in various unstructured, fragmented instruments.
Two variations are common in organization arrangements: dualfunction authorities act as an investigator and supervisor, and a group of
authorities have specific functions in an ad hoc committee. Despite the
differences, the two variations are the means to exercise power over the
regulated parties. The advantage of having powerful or dual-function
entities is minimizing the barrier related to hierarchical organizations.
However, this type of authority, if not balanced with social control from
other parties, may degrade collaborative thinking and actions such that
one organization becomes dominant and politically imposes their power
on nonprofits and other government institutions. By contrast, because
the ad hoc type is typically case-driven, it has been more advisable
for the operational rather than the policy level. However, the ad hoc
is more favorable for an organization arrangement to prevent terrorist
financing. This platform would potentially stimulate collaborative coordination instead of the polarization of powers within small parts of
an interagency coordination framework.
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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The evidence drawn has illustrated two aspects: the mechanisms
of coordination within exemplar countries and the effectiveness of the
attempts to prevent terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits that are
driven by these existing mechanisms. Figure 1 shows a comparison between Indonesia and the four exemplar countries based on the evidence
produced from the exemplar countries’ experiences and the Indonesian
problems as described in the Introduction section. However, the classification has functioned as an illustration of Indonesia’s current policies
and instruments and how they may be more likely to increase rather
than decrease terrorist-financing risks. The proposed joined-up government adapted from the exemplar countries’ experience is proposed as
a means to move Indonesia’s position to the top-right area in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Country comparison of the prevention of terrorist-financing offenses by nonprofits

Source: Compiled by author from related sources

JOI N ED - U P G OV ER N M EN T M ECH A N ISMS
FOR PR E V EN T I NG T ER ROR IS T- F I NA NCI NG
OF F ENSES BY NON PROF I T S

The Indonesian authorities may apply several means to improve its interagency coordination. First, Kemendagri, Kemenkumham, Kemenlu,
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol5/iss2/4
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Kemenag, and Kemensos must match, integrate, and post their databases on an online platform accessible to other authorities. Furthermore,
the NCC must temporarily assign an ad hoc interministerial group to
be responsible for the registration and validation of nonprofits before
permanently transferring these processes to Kemendagri as the single
registrar.
Second, Kemendagri, Kepolisian RI, PPATK, BNPT, and BIN must
conduct and frequently evaluate risk assessment documents on nonprofits and terrorist financing to identify the vulnerabilities and the
changing trends of terrorist-financing threats. This assessment must be
democratic and deliberative with active participation from nonprofits
as the regulated sector. As a response to the results of that assessment,
Kemendagri and PPATK—through legal arrangements—may define
nonprofits as reporting parties in the AMLCFT regime. Moreover, Kemendagri and PPATK must escalate the results to the NCC to obtain
political commitments to ensure effective processes in resource allocation and policy synchronization.
Third, according to the risk assessment results, PPATK and Kemendagri must cooperate with nonprofits to formulate the means and
priorities of socialization and education. This participative process is
necessary to design the tailormade programs that are advisable for the
nonprofit sector, for example, management of the reports on donations
and the annual financial statement. Monitoring and supervision are set
as the sequence of socialization and education to stimulate nonprofits’
voluntary compliance. Fourth, this article strongly recommends the
network model within ad hoc and case-based working groups as the
voluntary information-sharing mechanism. This model potentially creates more flexibility and minimizes problems related to hierarchical
structures.
CONCLUSION

The proposed model that has been drawn from the exemplar countries’
experiences may not comprise ideal mechanisms to solve the drawbacks
of Indonesia’s interagency coordination in preventing terrorist-financing
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2020
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offenses. Indonesia’s coordination mechanisms are complex because
they have involved different authorities to reach a common goal; moreover, the policies, functions, and responsibilities implemented to reach
that common goal were fragmented and unstructured. Evidence from
the four countries that we investigated illustrates that effective interagency coordination that is likely to reduce the risks of terrorist financing should first synchronize the policies, objectives, functions, and responsibilities among the authorities. Then, authorities can prioritize the
allocation of interventions and resources to the most vulnerable factors.
This article suggests four improvements: collaborative improvements
toward single integrated databases; comprehensive risk assessments of
nonprofits; prioritizing socialization, education, monitoring, and supervision; and a network model to improve voluntary information sharing.
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